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Introduction 
Since the outset of systemic transformation, Central East European countries (CEECs) 
have achieved a profound level of real economy integration with Western European 
countries. Some transition economies can expect to participate in the European Single 
Market in a few years time. Levels of economic development in accession candidates 
are still much lower than the average EU-15 level  most probably granting them access 
to EU Structural and Cohesion Fund policies. 
The reasons explaining lower levels of economic development not only lie with 
technological backwardness, institutional, managerial and organisational deficiencies 
but are also rooted in the sectoral specialisation patterns of the economies. Sectoral 
structures play a relevant role in a framework of economic catch-up development via 
integration: first, the pattern of sectoral specialisation can explain some of the lower 
levels o f economic development, measured here as productivity gaps  vis-à-vis the EU-
average. Second, assuming some degree of path dependency in sectoral patterns, the 
emerging international division of labour can limit the scope for complete catch-up: as 
integration deepens, technology and skills in CEECs will improve, institutions will be 
reformed to match the ones in the EU (via the  acquis communautaire) but sectoral 
structures might remain rigid and limit real economy convergence. 
Assuming that deepening integration with the West and eventual EU membership does 
not necessarily have to lead to complete economic convergence in all accession 
countries, the aim of this paper is to determine the prospects of economic catch-up for a 
selection of accession countries and to assess the scope for economic policy to assist 
improving the conditions for economic development. This is not to deny that integration 
generally is a necessary condition for catch-up development in transitional CEECs via 
technology transfer and efficiency-improving participation in intra-industrial trade 
and/or specialisation. Rather, integration might prove to be insufficient. In its latest 
report on economic cohesion, the EU Commission takes the opinion that sectoral 
structures in candidate countries  will prove to be decisive in a process of real economy 
convergence (EU 2001b, pp. 37-41). The report suggests to target EU cohesion policies 
towards the intermediate aim of structural change. 
The approach used in this analysis is methodologically more deterministic than most 
related research into the structural development in CEECs (e.g. Gács 2001
1). An 
                                                 
1  Here, structural patterns are compared to the ones prevailing prior to systemic change and the ones 
prevailing in the EU today. The analysis does not determine what patterns or what direction or what 
intensity of change is normatively better or worse for the process of economic catch-up.  
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example for research providing a normative account for sectoral structures by use of the 
Clark-concept of a close correlation between  per capita  GDP levels  and sectoral 
specialisation patterns is Döhrn/Heilemann 1991, 1993. Here, sectoral differences 
determine the intensity and direction of future sectoral adjustment. 
The selection of accession countries includes in geographical order Estonia, Poland, the 
Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Slovenia. These countries appear to be 
amongst the most likely transition economy candidates for EU membership in the 
coming years. The period of analysis starts 1995 (by then, the most profound structural 
breaks in prices and the allocation of employment have already occurred) and ends 1999 
with the latest comparative data available for all countries assessed. For empirical 
reasons, this paper assesses labour productivity and disregards the productivities of 
other factors of production, as  e.g. capital. Moreover, the most profound modernisation 
of capital stock is still under way, making year-on-year comparisons difficult. This is 
not to neglect that an analysis of capital productivity and total factor productivity could 
lead to slightly different results and that such will gain more importance with transition 
countries reaching higher levels of economic and technological development. 
The paper first provides a brief overview over comparative levels of national 
productivities between the EU-average, selected EU cohesion countries and accession 
countries. The focus of the analysis is on the role played by sectoral structures: first, an 
indicator is being developed to quantify the explanatory power of patterns of sectoral 
structures for the size of the productivity gap. Following from there, the respective roles 
of individual sectors in explaining the national productivity gaps are being calculated. 
These results are carefully assessed in terms of potentials and prospects for a swift and 
complete productivity catch-up and in terms of the most efficient policies to assist 
productivity convergence. 
1  The stylised facts - the observed productivity gap 
Within the past decade, national levels of labour productivity in CEECs (in the 
following: ‘productivity levels’) have converged significantly towards the levels 
predominant in the EU. Yet, levels are still significantly lower, large gaps are still 
prevalent. Needless to say, levels within the EU also differ greatly; comparisons with 
the EU as an economic area use the weighted average of all current 15 EU member 
states. 
Table 1 reports levels in 1000€ for the year 1999, calculated by use of annual average 
market exchange rates as well as PPP-corrected exchange rates (shaded columns).  All 
countries reported have lower living expenses than the EU-15 average (measured in  
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terms of living expenses), hence the significantly higher figures for PPP-adjusted 
levels.
2 In 1999, three groups of countries amongst CEECs with similar productivity 
levels can be identified: Estonia and Poland rank in a lowest productivity group, the 
Slovak and Czech Republics as well as Hungary in a second and Slovenia sticks out as 
the country with the highest productivity level. At the outset of economic trans-
formation and integration into western markets, productivity levels were not only much 
lower but also more diverse. Slovenia had always achieved higher productivity levels 
even during its socialist era; the gap to its fellow accession candidates has even further 
increased. Throughout the 1990s, productivity levels of Hungary and the Czech 
Republic were more or less the same, albeit Hungary growing at a slightly faster rate. 
Ever since the break-up of the CSFR remained the Slovak Republic’s productivity level 
slightly lower than the ones of the Czech Republic and Hungary. Estonia started from a 
low level but managed to overtake Poland in 1997. 
Table 1  Productivity levels in the EU and CEECs, in end 1999 
  Market exchange rates  PPP-exchange rates 
  in 1000 € per employment  in % of EU-15 
EU-15    41.8    41.8    100.0 
East Germany    36.0    36.9    88.3 
Portugal    9.8    15.1    36.1 
Greece    18.4    23.7    56.7 
Spain    26.1    31.9    76.3 
Estonia    7.6    17.8    42.6 
Poland    8.2    17.4    41.6 
Czech Republic    9.8    24.0    57.4 
Slovak Republic    8.3    22.6    54.1 
Hungary    10.2    23.9    57.2 
Slovenia    19.5    29.9    71.5 
Note:  Aggregate, economy-wide productivity levels calculated as aggregate value added per employ-
ment. 
Source:  EUROSTAT, WIIW, National Statistical Offices, own calculations. 
All transition economies in our sample exhibit sizeable productivity gaps  vis-à-vis the 
EU-average and most of the 15 European economies (last row of the table). All of them 
have already surpassed Portugal, the EU member country with the lowest national 
                                                 
2  For the purpose of international comparison, such PPP-correction is advisable. This, however, must 
not be confused with the concept of the purchasing-power parity theory but is purely a method to 
improve comparability and is used throughout the literature. In the case of the EU, the EUROSTAT 
Power Purchasing Standard has been applied; for the CEECs, the PPP-estimates of WIIW were used.  
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productivity level. Only three, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia, command 
higher levels than Greece, the second but weakest EU member country. In comparison 
to the average EU-15 level in end 1999, Slovenia reaches more than 70%, Hungary, the 
Czech and Slovak Republics more than 55% and Poland and Estonia more than 40%. 
Of particular interest is the comparison of CEECs with East Germany. In effect also a 
transition economy, East Germany was integrated into the ESM and the currency-area 
of the West German DM already in 1990. Moreover, East Germany was integrated into 
the German  Länderfinanzausgleich, a system of re-distribution of revenues to support 
weaker  Länder on the cost of more prosperous ones. The country (or rather region) 
therefore gained access to a s table currency, a stable institutional framework and vast 
financial resources for investment and restructuring, all of which was not available in 
fellow transition countries. East Germany was able to nearly close up to the EU-15 
productivity level within o nly a few years while catch-up in fellow transition countries 
is generally expected to take many more years: in the latest EU report on accession 
countries (EU 2001a), it is assumed that Poland will converge to 75% of the average 
EU-15 level in only 33 years, Slovakia in 20, Estonia in 19, the Czech Republic in 15, 
Hungary in 11 and Slovenia in as little as 1 year. 
2  Sectoral determinants of the productivity gap 
Reasons explaining the significantly lower levels of productivity in CEECs relative to 
most EU e conomies are manifold and include lower levels of technology, a less 
developed institutional framework, lower intensity and quality of organisational as well 
as management expertise and patterns of specialisation in the international (mainly 
European) division of labour.
3 
Intuitively, the productivity gap between CEECs and the EU predominantly reflects the 
fact that the transition economies command less sophisticated technologies, in quantity 
and/or in quality. Indeed, there can be little doubt that firms i n CEE on average apply 
less or lower levels of technology as compared to the West and hence exhibit lower 
levels of productive efficiency in the use of factors at firm level. Nevertheless, there will 
already exist individual firms which, by having invested into the latest technology or 
have benefited from the transfer of the latest technology from the West, can even 
                                                 
3  In this respect, a three-year research project concentrating on the same sample of countries and their 
determinants of the productivity gap relative to the EU assesses all those reasons. The project is co-
ordinated at the IWH. Results and proceedings will be made available to the academic community on 
the project web-page at the IWH: www.iwh-halle.de/projects/productivity-gap.  
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outpace comparable firms in the West in terms of productivity. Technology levels or 
even technological development in CEECs are very difficult  to grasp in terms of 
empirical analysis
4 directly. The focus of this paper is on sectoral structures: first, the 
sectoral analysis presented here identifies the extent to which national productivity gaps 
are rooted exclusively in sectoral specialisation patterns. If such patterns reflect 
comparative advantages,  i.e. if some degree of path dependency can be assumed, then 
those results will give account of the extent of future productivity convergence to be 
expected in each accession candidate. Second, structural analysis yields a quantitative 
account of the respective roles played by individual sectors in determining the national 
productivity gap and its development. Such insight is indispensable when assessing 
efficiency of economic policy-options geared towards assisting a swift convergence of 
levels of national productivity according to the cohesion-approach taken by the EU 
Commission (see EU 2001b). 
2.1  Specialisation and the sectoral content of the productivity gap 
Transformational recession and restructuring with its associated historically un-
precedented decline in industries, as well as the high employment shares of agriculture 
and lower shares in services in CEECs suggest that some of the productivity gap is 
rooted in the sectoral patterns of transition economies. In the assessment of the EU 
Commission, most of the productivity gap can be explained by diverging structural 
specialisation patterns (EU 2001b). Gaps of average, national productivity levels 
between two countries can arise even if all respective sector-specific productivity levels 
are equal,  i.e.  even if technology levels have caught up and corresponding firms would 
be equally productive. One country achieves a higher level of productivity, if it has 
higher (employment) shares in sectors with  intrinsically higher levels of sectoral 
productivity relative to other sectors. This is the essence of sectorally determined 
productivity gaps. 
What is the extent to which the productivity gaps of individual CEECs vis-à-vis the EU-
15 average are rooted in  the respective sectoral patterns? The average, national 
productivity level  p of a country  is defined as the sum of each product of sectoral 
productivity levels p 
i and employment shares a of sectors i: 
  ( ) ￿ =
i
i i a p p   (1) 
                                                 
4  Earlier attempts to calculate technological advance in CEECs by use of the  growth accounting 
method, based on the estimation of a production function, proved to be insufficiently robust. Not least, 
available data for capital stocks from national statistical offices were at times dubious (refer to: 
Stephan 1999).  
6 
The productivity gap between an individual country in CEE and the average EU-15 
level  EU CEE / p  is then calculated as: 
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This sectoral productivity gap is then related to the total of the observed productivity 
gap to denote the percentage share of the sectoral content in the national productivity 
gap (equation 4): 
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Chart 1 depicts the sectoral contents of the productivity gaps in observed total 
productivity gaps in 1995 and 1999,  i.e. the extend to which the national productivity 
gaps are rooted in the respective patterns of specialisation. 
The explanatory power of the sectoral structure for the size of the productivity gap is 
very different amongst the selection of transition economies and between the two years 
of observation: had the Slovak Republic had the same sectoral employment pattern as 
the economic region of the EU-15 in end 1999, then the productivity gap would have 
amounted to some 14 percentage points lower than is the case with the current pattern. 
The sectoral content of the Slovak Republic’s productivity gap therefore amounts to a 
share of nearly 28% in the observed productivity gap. The gaps of Hungary, Poland and 
Slovenia in 1999 can also be explained to a large extent (around 20%) by their 
respective sectoral patterns whilst the sectoral determinant does not contribute 
significantly to explaining  the productivity gaps of Estonia and the Czech Republic  vis-
à-vis the EU (some 5-6%). The result for the latter countries incidentally corresponds to  
 
                                                 
5  This is not to imply structural convergence in a normative manner of methodology. Rather, this 
method calculates a hypothetical level which will never be achieved given today’s technology.  
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Sources:  EUROSTAT, WIIW, National Statistical Offices, own calculations. 
  
8 
the sectoral content of the productivity gap between East and West Germany (IWH, 
2000, p. 61). In the case of Poland, the results have to be interpreted with caution, most 
of the sectoral content calculated might be due to a particular empirical distortion in the 
agricultural employment share of nearly 28%.
6 When assuming an agricultural employ-
ment share comparable to the methodology applied in other transition economies, i.e. a 
much lower share yet still significantly higher than in other transition economies, then 
the sectoral content would become negligible. Poland would then rank amongst the 
group with Estonia and the Czech Republic. The high sectoral content therefore is 
driven overwhelmingly by the large employment share in the agricultural sector. 
What are the main driving sources of the sectoral content in the other countries? In the 
Slovak Republic, of enterprise-related services exhibit only one third of employment as 
compared to the EU-15. These have particularly high levels of intrinsic productivities: 
on average, they exhibit a level of productivity of nearly 4 times the national average in 
the Slovak Republic. The immense growth of the sectoral content between 1995 and 
1999 cannot be explained by employment shifts between sectors only, employment 
shares did not change that much. Rather, sectoral productivities grew particularly fast in 
enterprise-related services,  i.e. the sectors which drive the high level of the sectoral 
content. In the case of Hungary, the high share of the sectoral determinant of the 
productivity gap can be explained by, again a low share in enterprise-related services, 
and additionally much higher employment shares in the agriculture a nd industrial 
sectors. In particular the former sector exhibits well below-average productivities in 
Hungary. Since 1995, employment shares of enterprise-related services have grown 
slightly at the expense of the sector of public administration. Also in Slovenia can the 
high sectoral determinant mainly be accounted for by a low share of employment in 
enterprise-related services and a comparatively higher share in industry. This share 
however, has been falling slightly and the employment share of public administration 
has grown. 
2.2  Sectoral structures and the prospects for real economy convergence 
Integration theory remains undetermined in respect to evolving structural patterns and 
their effects on the conditions of economic development: one strand of theory assumes 
                                                 
6  Employment data in official Polish statistics distinguish less clearly between former occupation of 
unemployed persons and mere ownership of agricultural land. Already during the socialist era, a large 
share of agricultural land was owned privately. In particular during transformational recession and its 
sharp decline of industrial employment, many former industrial workers, having been laid off, tried to 
make a living by way of subsistence farming. In other transition economies, unemployed workers with 
an industrial employment history do not enter agricultural employment statistics.  
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that technological development is typically correlated with structural patterns. This is 
the essence of ‘logistic growth path’ concepts, the Clark-concept or the Chenery-
Hypothesis, linking the level of economic development and sectoral productivities to 
sectoral structures and hence average, economy-wide productivity levels (concept first 
raised by Clark 1940, see  e.g. Cornwall/Cornwall 1994, and in an application on 
transition economies: Döhrn/Heilemann 1991, 1993 and Mickiewicz/Zalewska 2001). 
But this is typically a very long-term effect of gradually maturing market economies 
and exceeds the time-scope of analysis in this assessment. Still, eventually some 
sectoral convergence of CEECs to the structures of more advanced economies in the EU 
can be expected as a very long-term trend.
7 In the shorter term, more relevant for the 
analysis here, the theory of comparative advantages predicts international specialisation 
emerging according to patterns of comparative advantages. In this case, evolving 
structures will persist for some time, giving rise to path dependency in the process of 
catch-up development. According to the factor-price-equalisation theorem, relative 
prices adjust in the process of specialisation to allow integrating partners to convergence 
in terms of  per capita income. It remains disputable, however, whether the notion of 
factor-price-equalisation holds in reality; or at the very least, in what time-spans this 
equalisation will take effect. In reality, as this analysis could indicate, do structural 
differences go some way in explaining differences in levels of economic development  - 
and in the short term, the explanatory power of structural differences can even grow in 
the process of intensifying integration. A further strand of theory works with the 
assumption that patterns of specialisation are not unidirectional, rather structural change 
or adjustment can make one or several detours (which not even prolong the time used 
for complete adjustment once income-levels have converged, the  so-called ‘turnpike-
models’). 
The assumption, underlying this analysis, is that the development of sectoral patterns in 
the course of intensifying integration with the EU will exhibit some degree of path 
dependency. Sectoral patterns in CEECs to some extent reflect country-specific features 
which might not vanish swiftly or might even develop some hysteresis during the 
                                                 
7  Analysis enquiring whether CEECs converge towards sectoral and branch structures in the EU 
conclude that (a) sectoral patterns appear to converge in all transition economies observed here, with 
Slovenia and Estonia exhibiting the slowest structural convergence (Mickiewicz/Zalewska 2001, p. 
20) and that (b) at a deeper level of disaggregation within manufacturing (2-digid NACE), Poland, the 
Czech and Slovak Republics and Slovenia exhibit falling structural deviation to the most advanced 
EU countries, whilst Hungary appears to converge neither towards the richer EU countries nor the 
EU-south patterns (Landesmann 2000, p. 26) and therefore could develop a distinctively comple-
mentary specialisation pattern in the international division of labour.  
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adjustment process: the development of human capital is a long-term process and a 
pattern of specialisation in the knowledge and skill-capital of an economy will not be 
subject to swift changes; investment in new capital will tend to reflect at least to some 
degree the field of activity, the technological level of sophistication,  etc. predominant in 
the economy. 
Given this assumption, the analysis yields another dimension: in the cases of the Slovak 
Republic, Poland and to a minor extent in Slovenia, the sectoral contents of productivity 
gaps have increased significantly. If such developments reflect patterns of specialisation 
emerging in the m edium to long-term and if those patterns persist or even get more 
pronounced, then complete productivity convergence is inconceivable in those countries 
even after catch up of all other determinants of lower levels of productivity. With a 
sectoral content  of the productivity gap of some 28% and a current productivity gap of 
some 46%, the Slovak Republic could experience some form of a ‘barrier’ to real 
convergence at a level of 87% of the EU-average even after e.g. technology had caught 
up completely to Western standards. Given her high level of unemployment, the country 
might not even be able to surpass the threshold of 75% of average EU-15 GDP  per 
capita income in the medium term to qualify for EU Structural Fund policies, this only 
due to her specialisation patterns. In the case of Hungary, a similar result may also 
apply due to the high value of the sectoral content, albeit here, some minor reduction in 
the sectoral share of the productivity gap can be observed. Only in the cases of the 
Czech Republic and Estonia do sectoral specialisation patterns not appear to be of a 
convergence-limiting kind. 
2.3  Sectoral productivity gaps: the role of individual sectors 
So far, sectoral analysis was concerned with the sectoral content of the productivity gap 
across the whole economy. That is, the analysis took into consideration sectoral 
specialisation patterns while not assessing the levels of productivity of individual 
sectors. In the following, sectoral analysis focuses on sectoral productivity gaps and the 
respective role the sectors play in explaining the national productivity gap. Again, the 
comparison drawn is to the average EU-15 levels: the EU-average is not used as a 
‘technology frontier area’ to assess potentials for productivity growth in individual 
sectors, but rather as a realistic benchmark to be achieved in terms of real economy 
convergence. 
If CEECs apply in general less sophisticated technology in production, then one can 
expect that comparative sectors in CEECs exhibit lower levels of productivities than in 
the EU. Such sectoral productivity gaps are not only significantly different in size but 
also in their relative weights within each economy assessed. Individual sectoral  
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productivity gaps are defined according to the same method as the national productivity 
gaps (from formula 2): 
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In order to provide a quantitative account of the role played by each sector in 
determining the national productivity gap, our analysis attaches respective weights in 
terms of employment shares to the sectoral productivity gaps. The indicator 
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denotes the percentage share of a sector as a source of the productivity gap.  
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The first term in formula (6) calculates the sectoral productivity gap (as defined in 
formula 5) and its respective weight in total employment. This is then related to the 
average, economy-wide productivity gap to exhibit the relative explanatory power of 
sector i in explaining the national productivity gap (the sum of all 
i
EU CEE /
~ p  equals 100). 
Table 2 provides an account of explanatory powers of individual sectors as a source of 
national productivity gaps for the selection of CEECs at the end of the year 1999. The 
most obvious result of this analysis is that in all t ransformation economies assessed, the 
producing sectors of industry (C+D+E) are mainly responsible for national productivity 
gaps: they exhibit the highest values of the indicator (solely in the case of Poland, the 
agricultural sector is the quantitatively strongest source of the national productivity 
gap
8), owed to in particular the typically highest productivity gaps amongst all sectors 
in combination with their high relative weight in the economies. 
The dominant role of the industrial sectors as a source of the productivity gap is 
particularly pronounced in the case of Slovenia, where over 50% of the national gap is 
caused by mining, manufacturing and electricity, gas and water supplies. Although the 
industrial sectors’ productivity gap had diminished significantly (by almost 10 
percentage points between 1995 and 1999), much smaller productivity gaps in other 
sectors and an exceptionally high employment share account for this dominant role. The 
Czech and Slovak Republics find nearly 40% of their national p roductivity gaps caused  
 
                                                 
8  Just as in the reasoning of the previous analysis in footnote 5, this result might be driven by a 
methodological difference in the treatment of unemployed land-owners as small-scale farmers. Again 
assuming a corrected employment share, the agricultural sector would be placed behind household-
related services (trade, transport and communication) in the list. The industrial sectors would then 
advance to the top of the list just as in the other countries assessed.  
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Table 2  The ranking of most influential sectors as a source of the productivity gap, in end 1999 
Estonia  Poland  Czech Republic  Slovak Republic  Hungary    Slovenia 
Sector  i p ~     Sector  i p ~     Sector  i p ~     Sector  i p ~     Sector  i p ~     Sector  i p ~  
C+D+E  31.9    A+B  40.6    C+D+E  39.2    C+D+E  38.1    C+D+E  34.5    C+D+E  51.5 
L - O  25.9    C+D+E  23.5    L - O  20.7    L - O  29.2    L - O  32.1    G+H+I  20.1 
G+H+I  19.7    L - O  14.8    G+H+I  20.3    G+H+I  14.4    G+H+I  20.6    L - O  12.7 
A+B  8.2    G+H+I  12.2    J+K  11.5    F  10.1    F  7.1    F  7.4 
F  7.3    J+K  5.8    F  6.3    A+B  8.4    A+B  4.7    J+K  6.4 
J+K  7.0    F  3.0    A+B  2.0    J+K  0.0    J+K  1.0    A+B  1.9 
Note:  Share of sectoral productivity gaps, weighted by employment shares, as a fraction of the sum of all weighted sectoral productivity gaps. 
  Classification of sectors according to ISIC, rev. 3 nomenclature, with: A+B...Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing; C+D+E...industrial sectors; 
F...construction; G+H+I...household-related services; J+K...enterprise-related services; L  - O...public administration sectors (defence; social security; 
education; health, social work; private households with employed persons).  
Source:  EUROSTAT, WIIW, National Statistical Offices, own calculations.  
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by the industrial sector: in both countries, industrial productivity gaps remained by-and-
large unchanged between 1995 and 1999. The lowest industry source for national 
productivity gaps  are to be found in Hungary and Estonia, the latter exhibiting a more 
evenly distribution of sectoral sources in general. In both cases, the industrial sectors’ 
productivity gap fell by some 5 percentage points during the period of analysis. 
The public administration sector (L  - O)
  9, the second most important source of national 
productivity gaps in this sample, will tend to be inflated in terms of employment in 
formerly socialist economies. This overmanning can, however, be expected to diminish 
gradually in the course of restructuring of these sectors. In the case of Hungary, nearly 
equal shares can be allocated to this sector as to the industrial sectors
10. In fact, the 
analysis would have ranked the public administration sector as the most important 
source  for the national productivity gap up until 1997. The productivity gap of the 
service sector fell by 6 percentage points during 1995 to 1999 with the employment 
share remaining unchanged. The biggest drop in this sector’s productivity gap was 
experienced by the Slovak Republic with 12 percentage points  - here, the state-
administration sector accounts for nearly 30 per cent of the national productivity gap. 
The role played by household-related services (G+H+I) is probably more due to a price 
effect than a question of efficient allocation of resources. Typically, household-related 
services are not internationally tradable. With rising income and wealth, prices for such 
services will tend to increase, narrowing the sectoral productivity gap and the sector’s 
role in the national productivity gap. Indeed, the sectoral productivity gap has narrowed 
significantly with Estonia having experienced the biggest drop of 15 percentage points 
and in the other accession countries by some 6 -8 percentage points. Enterprise-related 
services (J+K) are to some extent tradable; in particular financial services are well 
integrated with the West. The intensity of competition is high, hence, productivity gaps 
are low. Prices for the non-tradable part of enterprise-related services (mainly to be 
found in real estate, renting and business activities, K) will tend to be lower due to the 
same reason as with household-related services and do not count as technology-
intensive. 
Given this assessment of results, the analysis indicates that in a ccession countries, 
potentials for a closure of the productivity gap today predominantly lie with efficiency-
                                                 
9  The calculation of levels of productivity in the services sectors in general and the state administration 
sector in particular is methodologically problematic due to the determination of prices and output. 
Results therefore have to be interpreted with due care. 
10  Hungary is the only transition economy within our sample to experience growth in the employment 
share of industry following de-industrialisation during transformational recession.  
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improvements in industry. Indeed, industrial productivity gaps have been falling during 
the period of analysis in Slovenia, Estonia and Hungary but not significantly in the 
Czech and Slovak Republics and Poland,  i.e. productivity growth in industry did not 
significantly exceed productivity growth in the EU in the latter country group. Given 
the demonstrated dominant role of industry in real economy c onvergence, this result 
suggests that the greatest shortcomings in the respective growth paths are to be found 
here. In the cases of Hungary and the Slovak Republic, and to a lesser extent in all other 
accession countries, future productivity increases also depend to a high degree on a 
reduction of historical overmanning in public administration. Productivity gaps in this 
sector diminished in all accession countries; only in the case of the Czech Republic was 
this improvement negligible. 
Not in all sectors  have levels of sectoral productivities converged: significant  increases 
in sectoral productivity gaps mainly occurred in the agricultural sectors of Hungary (10 
percentage points), Poland (4.7) and the Slovak Republic (3.9). In all those countries, 
the employment share of agriculture has been falling slightly and can be expected to 
continue to fall, so that the role of this sector in determining the national productivity 
gap might also diminish slowly. 
3  Summary and some economic policy considerations 
EU accession countries in CEE exhibit levels of labour productivity which are lower 
than the EU-15 average; the most prosperous transition countries reach levels 
comparable to Greece and Spain, and productivity levels of all accession candidates in 
the sample exceed the level of Portugal, the weakest EU member state. 
The analysis could provide ample evidence that structural patterns in the sectoral 
composition of economies assessed play a relevant role in Hungary, the Slovak 
Republic and Slovenia. In the Slovak  Republic and to a lesser extent in Slovenia, the 
explanatory powers of sectoral specialisation patterns have even increased significantly. 
These results suggest that the prospects for complete real economy convergence could 
be evaluated less optimistically in those countries as compared to the Czech Republic 
and Estonia, if assumed that such structures prevail during a process of path dependent 
catch-up development in the medium term. In respect to economic policies geared 
towards assisting a swift process  of economic catching up, the results would suggest 
that promoting technological development alone could prove to be insufficient in those 
countries. Rather, measures geared towards increasing the flexibility in the reallocation 
of production factors to promote sectoral change could be a decisive factor in Hungary, 
the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. Here, the opinion taken by the EU in its latest  
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cohesion report (EU 2001b) appears to be well founded. The assessment of Poland 
depends entirely on the view taken with respect to agricultural employment. If it were as 
high as quoted in national statistics, then complete real economy convergence would 
depend strongly on sectoral change reducing agricultural employment to the benefit of 
industry and services.  
The analysis into the most important sectors determining the national productivity gaps 
established that the closure of the productivity gap lies in all accession candidates 
predominantly with efficiency-improvements in industrial sectors and in Hungary, the 
Slovak Republic and Estonia furthermore with a reduction of historically high 
employment in the public administration sector ( e.g. the social security system). Here, 
future productivity increases depend to a high degree on a reduction of historical 
overmanning in public administration. This will largely depend on the ability of the 
governments to execute potentially socially painful reforms of the state administration 
and social systems: this might prove especially difficult in the case of Hungary, where 
the  formally well developed social security system had been significantly downsized in 
the austerity programme of March 1995. It remains to be seen whether accession 
candidates are able to introduce reforms to their state administrations whilst retaining a 
socially acceptable level of social security. 
Economic policy in CEECs could in general be most efficient in closing the 
productivity gap, if focussed on an upgrading of technology and organisation-efficiency 
in industry via technology transfer and indigenous research and development. Foreign 
direct investment, closer ties in production, innovation and marketing networks 
spreading across the West and accession countries, improvement of infrastructure as 
well as financial support and integration of firm-R&D and universities are the typical 
and well tested political measures in this field. Not least, such policies can also increase 
the flexibility of production factors to promote the kind of sectoral change that this 
analysis pointed out as necessary for complete productivity catch-up. 
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